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Abstract 
Using a large village survey conducted in 2002, this paper examines the relationship between local 
governance and public goods provision in rural China focusing on village- and county-levels. The 
main points of this paper are as follows. First, regarding to rural governance at the village level, we 
have found that promoting 'grassroots democracy' is important to make village administration more 
public service-oriented. Second, as for the governance at the county level, although detailed 
information on the characteristics of county governance are not available at present, our examination 
using county's fiscal statistics suggests that increase in intergovernmental fiscal transfer to county 
budget does not necessary produce improvement in rural public goods provision by the county 
government and that the retrenchment of public servants tends to affect public servants working in 
rural area such as teachers and medical workers than the administrative officials. Thus the 
characteristics of governance at the county level matters because it actually determines the delivery 
of public goods.  
JEL classification: H42; H72; H77 
Keywords: public goods provision; local governance; intergovernmental relations; rural 
China   2
1. Introduction 
The widening urban–rural disparity in public goods provision is one of the most crucial 
issues to be settled for building a ‘harmonious urban–rural relationship’ in China. It is 
noteworthy that the Chinese government has recently developed a series of prorural policies 
to increase public expenditure to meet the peasants’ needs. However, if the increase in fund 
allocation is not accompanied by effective public governance in rural areas, the policy 
outcomes might be discouraging. Focus, therefore, should be put on how to build good 
governance for public goods provision in rural areas. Using a large administrative village 
survey conducted in 2002, this paper examines the relationship between local public goods 
provision and rural governance. Although China’s local administrative system is 
multilayered, this paper focuses on the administrative village (hereafter referred to as 
village) level and the county level. 
  The main points of this paper are as follows. First, regarding rural governance at the 
village level, we have found that promoting ‘grassroots democracy’ is important to make 
village administration more public service oriented. Second, in relation to governance at the 
county level, our examination using county fiscal statistics suggests that increases in 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the county budget do not necessarily produce an 
improvement in rural public goods provision by the county government. It also suggests that 
the retrenchment of public servants paid from the county budget tends to affect public 
servants working in rural areas such as teachers and medical workers more than 
administrative officials. Thus the characteristics of governance at the county level matter   3
because they determine the delivery of public goods. Further research is needed on the 
factors that influence county government decision making. 
  The main data source for this paper is a large administrative village survey conducted 
in 2002. The survey is a part of the Chinese Household Income Project organized by the 
Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (hereinafter referred to as the 
2002 CASS CHIP survey).
2 In the 2002 CASS CHIP survey, we circulated an administrative 
village questionnaire to village cadres simultaneously with a household questionnaire.
 We 
collected statistical data and other village-level information on the 961 administrative 
villages where the 9200 sample households lived. The sampling frame for the household 
survey was a subsample of the official rural household survey of the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS). Thus, the surveyed administrative villages represented the lowest unit of 
the NBS’s stratified sampling strategy and were chosen from the NBS’s designated survey 
counties according to their income level (see Appendix A regarding the distribution of 
sample villages in the surveyed provinces). 
  This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of current 
prorural policies. In Section 3, we confirm the influence of rural taxation reform (tax-for-fee 
reform) on village budgets, and then investigate the relationship between village governance 
and the delivery of public services at the village level. Using fiscal statistics at the county 
level, Section 4 examines the correlation between changes in a county’s fiscal conditions and 
fund allocation to primary education in post-taxation-reform villages. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Overview of prorural reforms after 2000. 
It was not until the beginning of the 21st century that the central government has launched a 
series of prorural reforms. The structure of the reform is summarized in Table 1. It is 
convenient to follow the phases of rural taxation reform as a focal point for reviewing the 
whole reform process. The taxation reform can be divided into the following three phases: 
Phase 1 tax-for-fee reform (2000-2003); Phase-2 gradual abolition of agricultural taxes 
(2004-2005); Phase 3: post agricultural tax era (2006-). 
Phases of the taxation reform 
  The basic policy in the phase-1 reform is the substitution of local levies collected at 
the village and township levels with formal taxation (ٮڿඥ).
3 In 2000, Anhui Province was 
designated as the national model area (൫ׄ) of the reform. In March 2002, the party and the 
central government expanded coverage of the reform. Most of the provinces had launched 
the reform by the end of 2002. The policy arrangements for 'tax-for-fee' are summarized as 
'three abolitions, two adjustments, and one reform'. 'Three abolitions' refers to the 
termination of the township levy (པᆓ๤Ԕ), the levy for rural education (୪ը࢝ტڸࡆ), 
and other local levies. 'One reform' indicates the reform of de fact tax collecting at the 
village level. The administrative village levy (ըิ਽) is to be abolished and fund for public 
services is to be financed by the budget transfer from upper level administration and case-by-
case basis fund collecting (၂൙၂ၰԔሧ). 'Two adjustments' refers to adjust (increase) the 
rate of taxation of the agricultural tax/the special agricultural tax (୪ြඥ, ୪หඥ) and to 
introduce the additional levy for agricultural taxes (ਆඥڸࡆ) as the substitute for local 
levies.   5
  The taxation reform has accelerated sharply after 2004 (phase 2). It shows that the 
Chinese leadership has begun to change the urban-biased institutional arrangements inherited 
from the planned economy era. It is stressing that 'unified institutional and policy 
arrangements for urban and rural development' (๤ԔӬཔ) are critical to sustaining economic 
development and social stability, not only at the rural level, but also at the national level. In 
March 2004, the State Council announced it would abolish agricultural taxes gradually 
within the next five years, excluding special agricultural taxes on tobacco and a few other 
products. The number of provinces that have abolished agricultural taxes was eight in 2004, 
including Heilongjiang and Jilin, which were nominated as the national model provinces for 
the reform. By September 2005, 28 provinces had abolished agricultural taxes. Many 
counties in three other provinces (Hebei, Shandong, Yunnan) also stopped collecting 
agricultural taxes in 2005.  
  On December 29, 2005, the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress 
voted that agricultural taxes should be abolished on January 1, 2006. "Agricultural tax has 
become history (People’s Daily, December 31, 2005)" and the post agricultural tax (ު୪ြ
ඥ) era has started. 
Education and medical care 
  Rural education after 1980s has been heavily depending on tuition/school fees (࿐ᄖ
ٮ) paid by parents and on fund collecting at the township/village levels (the levy for rural 
education, township/village levies, and ad hoc fund collecting or compulsory donations). The 
basic direction of the educational reform is from such a 'self-reliance' at the local level to 
nationally supported compulsory education. In the phase 1, the levy for rural education has 
been abolished and fiscal source for teachers' salaries has been transformed from township   6
budget to county budget. According to the instruction of the State Council distributed in 
December 2005, 'two exemptions and one subsidy (ਆ૧၂Ҁ)', that is, exemptions of tuition 
and school fees and subsidy for dormitory fee, has been introduced in the western regions 
from 2006. At the same time, subsidy from central budget for operational expenses of the 
schools has been employed in the western regions. Also, fund arrangement from central 
budget to make repairs on school building and facilities has started.  
  The major point of the reform of medical care in rural area is the establishment of the 
new rural cooperative medical insurance (ྍ྘୪ըކቔ၄ਏЌག), which is operated at the 
county level. Experiments of the new cooperative medical insurance has begun in phase 2 
and, in January 2006, the central government announced to expand the coverage of the new 
cooperative medical insurance into 40 percent of the whole counties. 
Local governance 
  Reform of local governance can be understood as two tiers: the highr-tier is 
governance at the county level and the lower-tier is village governance (ըࠩᇍ৘). 
Improvement of local governance is associated with the retrenchment of governmental 
departments and agencies (ࡥᆟ٢ಃ) because tax cut in rural area is premised on the 
reduction of the cost of government.  
  For governance at the county level, the major points are the restructure of 
government and the strengthen of intergovernmental fiscal transfer (ҍᆟሇ၍ᆦڱ) into the 
county budget. Retrenchment (ࣚࡥބٳੀ) of public servants paid by county/township 
budget is also emphasized. Merger of townships (Ӝཔѩᆓ) has been promoted. Moreover, 
direct control of township budget by county government (པҍཅܵ) is encouraged.   7
  For village governance, more attention is paid for how to improve the monitoring of 
village cadres. Monitoring is to be done from two directions. One is the 'grassroots 
democracy (ࠎҪ૶ᇶ)' such as direct election of village cadres (૶ᇶ࿊ई) and disclosure of 
village affaires (ըༀ܄ष) to doing monitoring from the bottom up by improving political 
participation. The other is monitoring from the upper governments, for example, the direct 
control of village budget by township government (ըҍཔܵըႨ). Merger of villages (ѩը) 
is also promoted.  
 
3. Village governance and local public goods provision 
Table 2 reports the relationship between the size of public expenditure from village budgets 
(hereinafter referred to as village expenditure) and the status of the tax-for-fee reform. From 
Table 2A, it is found that approximately 40 percent of the sample villages have experienced 
a decrease in village expenditure on public services (services for peasants’ economic 
activities such as irrigation, education, health care, and other services) between 1998 and 
2002 and that the postreform villages are more likely to experience decreases in public 
expenditure. The proportion of villages that recorded a greater than 20 percent decrease is 
around 32 percent for postreform villages whereas the relevant figure for prereform villages 
is about 20 percent.
4 This fact suggests that the abolition of local levies has directly affected 
local public goods provision from each village’s own budget. 
  It is interesting that there is no simple relationship between changes in village 
expenditure after the tax-for-fee reform and the level of regional economic development (see 
Table 2 B). The proportion of postreform villages showing a decrease in village expenditure   8
on public services is relatively small in the lowest income region (the first decile group) and 
in the highest income region (the tenth decile group). The former will reflect the favorable 
fiscal treatment for underdeveloped regions by the central and provincial governments. The 
latter can be explained by sound local public finance at the county/township levels and 
sufficient fiscal transfers to the village level. Also, villages located in high-income regions 
are more likely to have their own revenue sources. In contrast to the lowest and highest 
income deciles, village expenditure on public services shows a sharp decrease in the 
postreform villages of the 7th and 8th decile groups, suggesting that both intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers and each village’s own financial ability are rather weak in the upper-middle-
income region. 
  We have seen that village expenditure on public services tends to decrease after the 
tax-for-fee reform (Table 2). Controlling for the size of village budgets, is there any 
difference in the structure of village expenditure between postreform villages and prereform 
villages? Do villages with good governance have more public-service-oriented finances than 
other villages? 
  To investigate this issue, we conducted a village-based Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimation of the determinants of the village budget structure in 2002. The dependent 
variable is the logit-transformed proportion of expenditure on public services to total village 
expenditure in 2002.
5 We try to capture the characteristics of village governance by the 
following two measurements that are assumed to reflect the degree of political participation. 
The first measurement is the frequency of villagers’ meetings. The second measurement is 
the type of appointment of village cadres (village head and other members of village 
committees).   9
  After the enforcement of the ‘Organizational Law of the Village Committee’ in 1987, 
most villages employed election of village cadres during 1990. As discussed in previous 
literature, the actual operation of village elections varies from place to place (O’Brien and Li 
2000; Oi and Rozelle 2000; Pastor and Tan 2000; Xu and Wu 2001; Zhang, Xu and Xiang 
2000). Here we categorize the appointment of village cadres into the following three types: 
(a) village cadres appointed by direct election, where villagers can nominate candidates 
directly (the higher degree in political participation); (b) village cadres appointed by upper 
administration (the lower degree in political participation); (c) village cadres appointed by 
direct election, where candidates are nominated by upper administration (the medium degree 
in political participation). Since the actual conditions of the appointment of village cadres 
vary considerably between regions and among villages in a region, it will be interesting to 
see whether the type of appointment of village cadres affects the structure of the village 
budget. 
  We hypothesize that, when all other factors remain the same, the degree of political 
participation positively correlated with the proportion of expenditure on public services to 
total village expenditure. Other factors to be controlled are the size of the village budget (per 
capita total expenditure from the village budget in 2002), major items of public services 
provided by the village, and the status of tax-for-fee reform. 
  The results of village-based OLS estimations are summarized in Table 3. In the 
postreform villages, both measures of the degree of political participation of villagers show a 
positive and statistically significant influence on public goods provision by the village as 
expected (equation 2), whereas no significant correlations are found in prereform villages   10
(equation 3). It is noteworthy that the effect of political participation is correlated with the 
status of tax-for-fee reform. 
 
4. County governance and public goods provision 
Changes in expenditure for public services at the village level do not show the whole picture 
of the flow of funds at the local level. If, as is expected by the reform policy, public 
expenditure for rural areas funded by county or provincial governments has increased, then 
there should be an improvement in the provision of local public goods in rural areas. 
Unfortunately it is not easy to extract the actual amount of government funding used for 
rural areas from aggregated fiscal statistics at the county/province levels. We would like to 
go on to develop a local public finance data set that can capture the provision of rural public 
goods in future research. Here we will report tentative findings using village cadres’ 
estimation of the changes in government funds spent on schools where the villagers’ children 
are educated, after the tax-for-fee reform. Although village cadres do not know the exact 
amount of government funding from upper government used for schools, they will be able to 
judge whether the financial conditions of the schools have improved after the tax-for-fee 
reform. 
  Table 4 summarizes the results. Only eight percent of the cadres of postreform villages 
report increases in public expenditure on schools after the tax-for-fee reform, whereas 
approximately 48 percent of cadres report decreases and 43 percent of cadres report no 
change. Even if we consider the incentive of rural cadres to underreport upper government 
investments, the results suggest possible deteriorations in public goods provision. It is   11
noteworthy that the proportions of village cadres reporting decreases in public expenditure 
on schools are relatively small in the lowest income region (the first decile group) and in the 
highest income region (the tenth decile group). Also, cadres of villages located in the upper-
middle-income region (7th and 8th decile groups) report larger decreases in public 
expenditure on schools. This finding again shows that the policy arrangements for rural 
public goods provision are not simply correlated with the level of regional economic 
development. 
  How then do the characteristics of governance at the county level affect changes in the 
educational expenditure before and after the tax-for-fee reform? Although detailed 
information on the characteristics of county politics is not available, we will be able to 
capture the characteristics of local public goods provision by the county government using 
official fiscal statistics at the county level. 
  We conducted village-based logistic regression estimation for the postreform villages. 
The dependent variable is the above-mentioned village cadres’ judgments on the changes in 
the educational expenditure on the village’s primary education after the tax-for-fee reform. 
To conduct ordered logistic regression, we transform the village cadres’ judgment into an 
ordinal variable (1 = decrease; 2 = no change; 3 = increase). As the explanatory variables, 
we employ the following variables describing the changes in the county budget structure 
before and after the tax-for-fee reform. County statistics for 1998 are used for the starting 
point, that is, the reference year for the prereform period. It should be noted that, although 
the reference year for judging the reform status is 2002, we use county statistics for 2001 as 
the endpoint because figures for 2002 are not available at present. The variables (a), (b), and 
(d) are collected from Caizhengbu Yusuansi (1999–2002) and the variable (c) is compiled   12
from Jiaoyubu and Guoajia Tongjiju (2003). Unfortunately, due to missing values of variable 
(c) for the counties located in Guangxi, Chongqing, Yunnan, and Xinjiang, the number of 
effective observations is reduced. Several rich counties without fiscal transfers are also 
excluded. The number of observations of postreform villages usable for the estimation is 
433.
6
  (a) Growth rate of  in-budget (ყෘଽ) fiscal revenue of the county government 
between 1998 and 2001 (per capita revenue in 2001 − per capita revenue in 1998) /per capita 
revenue in 1998).
7 This is a measurement of the growth rate in the county’s own financial 
ability. We anticipate that this variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable. 
  (b) Growth rate of intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the upper-level governments 
between 1998 and 2001. We measure the size of the fiscal transfers by the per capita amount 
of the fiscal deficit (difference between per capita total fiscal expenditure and per capita in-
budget fiscal revenue). The growth rate of fiscal transfers is defined as (per capita fiscal 
transfer in 2001 − per capita revenue in 1998) /per capita revenue in 1998). 
  We expect that this variable is also positively correlated with the dependent variable 
since, as mentioned in Section 2, strengthening of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is one of 
the most important policy arrangements after 2000 that is complementary to the taxation 
reform.. 
  (c) Reduction of urban bias in educational expenditure between 1998 and 2001. When 
the persistent urban bias of fund allocation at the local level is considered, an increase in the 
size of the county’s educational budget does not necessarily mean actual improvement in the 
input to rural education. Thus, we employ a measurement defined as the proportion of the 
amount of per-student educational expenditure from the county budget used on the students   13
in rural areas (children of rural residents having rural household registration) to per-student 
expenditure in total. The reduction of urban bias is measured as the difference in the 
proportions between 1998 and 2001. 
  (d) Progress of the retrenchment of officials in the county government. We measure 
the size of the county government relative to population size using the ratio of the total 
number of public servants paid by the county budget to the county’s total population. Then 
we employ a dummy variable that indicates whether the indicator has decreased from 1998 
to 2001 or not (1 = decreased; 0 = not decreased). As discussed in Section 2, retrenchment of 
local officials at the county level is another important prorural reform policy that is 
complementary to the tax-for-fee reform. However, since a large proportion of public 
servants paid by the county budget are those who serve rural areas, such as schoolteachers 
and medical workers, the retrenchment policy might cause deterioration in rural public 
services. If so, we will find a negative correlation between this measure and the dependent 
variable. 
  In addition to the variables measuring the structure of the county budget, we introduce 
two dummy variables that indicate whether the sample villages are located in nationally 
designated poor counties or autonomous regions of ethnic minorities. We expect that these 
variables measuring regional targeting policies positively affect rural public goods provision. 
We also employ county per capita GDP and its squared term to control for the overall level 
of regional economic development and to confirm the U-shaped relationship between the 
change in the input to rural education and the level of regional economic development found 
in Table 4.   14
  Table 5 reports the results of the regressions. The following points can be made from 
the table about variables relating to the county budget. First, it seems that increases in 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers do not necessarily bring about the expected improvements 
in rural public goods provision. The change in fiscal transfers (variable (b)) shows no 
statistically significant correlation with the change in fund allocations to rural education, 
whereas improvement in the county’s own financial ability (variable (a)) shows a positive 
and statistically significant correlation. Second, as is expected, the reduction in urban bias in 
educational expenditure at the county budget (variable (c)) has brought about improvements 
in the financial situation of primary education at the village level. Third, retrenchment of 
public servants tends to cause deterioration in inputs to rural education rather than bringing 
about a more public-service-oriented budget structure, suggesting that the retrenchment 
policy affects public servants working in rural areas more than administrative officials. 
  None of the two regional policy variables show the expected results. The dummy 
variable for villages located in the autonomous regions of ethnic minorities shows positive 
correlation with the change in fund allocation, the level of statistical significance is less than 
10 percent. The dummy variable for nationally designated poor counties is negative and 
insignificant. 
  From Table 5, we have also confirmed a U-shaped relationship between the level of 
regional economic development and the change in fiscal input on rural education after the 
tax-for-fee reform.   15
5. Concluding remarks 
We have examined the relationship between local governance and public goods provision in 
rural China at the village level and the county level. The main points can be summarized as 
follows. 
  First, regarding rural governance at the village level, we have found that promoting 
‘grassroots democracy’ has the effect of making village cadres more public service oriented. 
Investigation of the correlation between the degree of political participation (village 
elections and villager meetings) and the village budget structure shows that village budgets 
tend to be more public service oriented in villages with relatively a higher degree of political 
participation. It is also found that the correlation between political participation and the 
village budget structure is stronger in postreform villages than in prereform villages, 
suggesting a complementary relationship among rural taxation reform, the reform of village 
politics, and local public goods provision. A criticism will be addressed that the current 
reform policies, in general, make the financial role of villages to provide public goods less 
important than prior to the 1990s. However the characteristics of village governance is still 
important because the village still is the gateway to to allocate fund from upper 
administration and to transmit peasants’ needs for public goods. 
  Second, as for governance at the county level, although detailed information on the 
characteristics of county governance are not available at present, our examination using 
county level fiscal statistics suggests that increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers to 
county budgets does not necessarily produce improvements in rural public goods provision 
by the county government. It also suggests that the retrenchment of public servants paid by 
county budgets tends to affect public servants working in rural areas such as schoolteachers   16
and medical workers more than administrative officials. Since intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers and retrenchment of local government officials has become more important for the 
delivery of rural public goods after the abolition of agricultural taxes, this finding suggests 
possible unfavorable policy outcomes for taxation reform. This is consistent with recent case 
studies in inland, purely agricultural regions that report serious deterioration in the delivery 
of public services after the abolition of agricultural taxes (see for example Lin and Ge 2004; 
Zhang, Zhang and Zhu 2004). It is not enough to increase intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
to the county budget. Thus, the characteristics of governance at the county level matter 
because they actually determine the delivery of public goods. Further research is needed on 
the factors that influence county governments’ decision making about the direction of the 
flow of public expenditure. 
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Table 1 An overview of pro-rural reforms after 2000 
 




 From tax-for-fee to abolition of 
taxes & levies 
Tax-for-fee (ٮڿඥ) reform 
*Substitution of local levies with 
formal taxation 
  Gradual abolition of agricultural taxes
*Agricultural taxes have been 
abolished in 22 provinces until 2005 
  Post-agricultural tax (ު୪ြඥ) era  
*Jan. 2006 The government announced 
abolition of agricultural taxes 
Education 
 
From 'self-reliance' at the 
local level toward nationally 
supported compulsory 
education 
* Abolition of the levy for rural 
education (୪ը࢝ტڸࡆ) 
*May, 2001 The state council 
introduced a new county-based 
educational system  (teachers' 
salaries are to be paid by the 
county budget) 
  *Dec., 2005 The State Council 
distributed an instruction to assure to 
the fund for rural compulsory 
education ("ܱႿധ߄୪ըၬༀ࢝ტࣜ
ٮЌᅰࠏᇅڿ۪֥๙ᆩ") 
  *The western region: exemption of 
tuition/school fees and subsidy for 
dormitory fee (ਆ૧၂Ҁ) ; subsidy from 
the central government for the 
operational expenses of the schools  
*The whole regions: fund arrangement 
from central budget to make repairs on 
school the building and facilities. 
 
Medical careToward 
nationally subsided medical 
insurance 
   * Experiment of new rural cooperative 
medical insurance (ྍ྘୪ըކቔ၄ਏ
Ќག) 
  *Expansion of the coverage of the  
cooperative medical insurance 
Local governance (ᇍ৘) 
 
 
County/township level : Restructure of government (ࣚࡥ) and the strengthen of intergovernmental fiscal transfer (ሇ၍ᆦڱ) 
  *Restructure of governmental departments and agencies (ࡥᆟ٢ಃ) 
  *Retrenchment (ࣚࡥބٳੀ) of public servants paid by county/township budget 
  *Merger of townships (Ӝཔѩᆓ)   *Direct control of township budget by county government (པҍཅܵ) 
 
  Village level: Grassroots democracy (ࠎҪ૶ᇶ), strengthened control over village, and village merger 
  *Direct election of village cadres (૶ᇶ࿊ई)  *Disclosure of village affaires (ըༀ܄ष) 
  *Direct control of village budget by township government (ըҍཔܵըႨ)  *Merger of villages (ѩը)   20
Table 2 Change in per capita village expenditure on public services by tax-for-fee reform status, 
1998–2002 






Decreased over 20%   31.9 20.4 28.5 
Decreased under 20%  10.5  10.2  10.4 
Increased under 20%  24.0  29.5  25.6 
Increased over 20%  33.6  40.0 35.5 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Per capita village expenditure on public services, 2002 
(Yuan, at current prices) 
42 64 48 
(Number of observations, villages)  (676) (285) (961) 
Pr = 0.003 
Note: This table reports changes in per capita village expenditure on public services between 1998 and 2002 
(deflated to 1998 prices using rural consumer price indices at the province level). Pr = indicates the level of 
significance of the chi square test of independence between changes in village expenditure and reform status. 
B. By level of regional income (postreform villages) (%) 
  Per capita GDP at the county level         
Changes in village 

















Decreased over 20%   9.1 36.2 30.8 32.9 46.8 25.0 19.3 31.9 
Decreased  under  20%  5.5  7.5  9.8 12.3 13.5 10.9  8.8 10.5 
Increased  under  20%  54.6 35.0 19.6 25.3 14.9 20.3 12.3 24.0 
Increased over 20%  30.9  21.3  39.8  29.5  24.8  43.8  59.7 33.6 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Per capita village 
expenditure on public 
services, 2002 
(Yuan, at current 
prices) 







(55)  (80) (133) (146) (141)  (64)  (57) (676)   21
Table 3 Village governance and the structure of village budgets: results of village-based OLS 
estimations 
Dependent variable: 
the logit-transformed proportion of expenditure on public 








Village governance       
Type of appointment of village cadres, 2002       
(a) Village cadres are appointed by direct election  0.409  0.687  –0.500 
where villagers can nominate candidates directly  (1.20)  (1.77)*  (0.69) 
     
(b) Village cadres are appointed by upper  0.488  0.636  –0.255 
administration  (1.03) (1.12) (0.29) 
(c) Village cadres are appointed by direct election 
where candidates are nominated by upper 
administration 
 
     omitted 
    
Number of villagers meetings held in 2002  0.158  0.156  0.129 
 (2.60)***  (2.12)**  (1.21) 
Public service provision by village budget, 2002       
Villages provide collectively managed irrigation  0.241  0.256  0.034 
service using village-owned facilities (dummy)  (1.14)  (0.98)  (0.09) 
     
Villages provide mechanized cultivating service  0.445  0.727  0.239 
 (1.54)  (1.88)*  (0.56) 
Reform status       
Postreform villages (dummy)  0.059  –  – 
 (0.16)     
     
Size of village budget in 2002 (Yuan)  0.001  0.002  –0.000 
  (3.19)*** (4.66)*** (0.03) 
     
Constant  –4.088 –7.103 –2.075 
  (5.04)*** (5.01)*** (1.85) 
Number of observations (villages)  888  638  250 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.113 0.103 0.172 
Note: This table reports the results of village-based OLS estimations of the determinants of the structure of village 
budgets. Province dummies are included in all equations, but are not reported here. t statistics are provided in 
parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   22
Table 4 Change in fund allocation to primary schools after the tax-for-fee reform 
  Per capita GDP at the county level         
 
Change in fund 



















13.0 25.6 25.8 23.4 28.9 23.8  3.7 23.0 
Decreased under 
25% 
19.6 18.0 28.0 25.5 34.1 23.8 14.8 25.4 
No change 
 
54.4 47.4 37.1 45.3 32.6 36.5 74.1 43.4 
Increased 
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Table 5 Ordered logistic regression estimations of the change in educational expenditure 
before and after the tax-for-fee reform 
Dependent variable: Village cadre’s judgment on the changes in educational 
expenditure on village primary education after the tax-for-fee reform 
(1 = decrease; 2 = no change; 3 = increase) 
(1) (2) 
Changes in the structure of the county budget      
(a) Growth rate of in-budget revenue of county government  0.973  0.977 
between 1998 and 2001  (3.01)***  (3.01)*** 
(b) Growth rate of intergovernmental fiscal transfer from  –0.064  –0.096 
the upper-level governments between 1998 and 2001  (–0.87)  (–1.24) 
(c) Reduction of urban bias in educational expenditure   0.878  0.897 
between 1998 and 2001  (2.96)***  (3.02)*** 
(d) Progress of retrenchment of the county government (dummy)  –0.740  –0.751 
  (–2.53)** (–2.52)** 
Level of regional economic development     
Per capita GDP at the county level 2001  –0.139  –0.158 
  (–1.68)* (–1.81)* 
Per capita GDP at the county level 2001 (squared)  0.011  0.011 
  (2.66)*** (2.70)*** 
Other variables relating to regional policy     
Dummy for nationally designated poor counties    –0.268 
   (–0.77) 
Dummy for villages located in the autonomous regions of    0.928 
ethnic minorities    (1.58) 
/cut1 (standard error)  1.253 (1.037)  1.955 (1.216)
/cut2 (standard error)  3.870 (1.056)  4.580 (1.235)
Log likelihood =   –371.182  –369.635 
Number of observations (villages)  433  433 
Note: This table reports the results of ordered logistic regression estimations of the village cadres’ judgments 
on the changes in educational expenditure on village primary education after the tax-for-fee reform. Province 
dummies are included in all equations, but are not reported here. Z statistics are provided in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  24
Appendix A Distribution of sample villages by the reform status in 2002 
 Counties  Administrative  villages 
Province Pre-reform  Post-reform Total Pre-reform Post-reform  Total
Beijing 1  1  2 10  6  16 
Hebei   0  5  5 0  37 37 
Shanxi 5  1  6 32  8  40 
Liaoning 5  1 6 37  8  45 
Jilin 0 6  6 0  48 48 
Jiangsu 0  5  5 0  44 44 
Zhejiang   4  2  6 32  21  53 
Anhui   0  5  5 0  44 44 
Jiangxi   0  6  6 0  43 43 
Shandong   1  6  7 2  61 63 
Henan 0  7  7 0  53 53 
Hubei   0  6  6 0  52 52 
Hunan   0  5  5 0  45 45 
Guangdong 4  3  7 31  22  53 
Guangxi   5  0  5 40  0  40 
Chongqing   0  2  2 0  20 20 
Sicuan   0  6  6 0  50 50 
Guizhou   0  6  6 0  40 40 
Yunnan 5  0 5 26  0  26 
Shaanxi   0  6  6 0  37 37 
Gansu   0  5  5 0  32 32 
Xinjiang   8  0  8 75  5  80 
Total 
 
38  84  122 285  676  961   25
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics of variables used in village-based regression estimations  
 
Variables used in Table 3 
The whole villages (Number of observations: 888 villages) 
    Variable                                                                                                                Mean    Std. Dev.  
Logit-transformed proportion of expenditure on public services                            -1.658      2.654 
to total village expenditure in 2002 (raw figures in parentheses)                           (0.318)    (0.266) 
Village cadres are appointed by direct election and                                                  .867       .340 
villagers can nominate candidates directly        
Village cadres are appointed by upper administration                                              .062       .241  
Number of villagers meetings held in 2002                                                            3.090      1.455  
Villages provide collectively managed irrigation service                                         .261       .440 
using village-owned facilities (dummy)       
Villages provide mechanized cultivating service                                                      .125       .331 
Post-reform villages (dummy)                                                                                   .718       .450  
Size of village budget in 2002 (yuan)                                                                  112.487    382.123 
 
Post-reform villages (Number of observations: 638 villages) 
    Variable                                                                                                                Mean    Std. Dev.  
Logit-transformed proportion of expenditure on public services                            -1.812    2.712 
to total village expenditure in 2002 (raw figures in parentheses)                            (.303)  (.265) 
Village cadres are appointed by direct election and                                                  .861    .347  
villagers can nominate candidates directly        
Village cadres are appointed by upper administration                                              .058     .234 
Number of villagers meetings held in 2002                                                            3.077    1.460 
Villages provide collectively managed irrigation service                                         .257    .437 
using village-owned facilities (dummy)       
Villages provide mechanized cultivating service                                                     .096    .294 
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Pre-reform villages (Number of observations: 250 villages) 
    Variable                                                                                                                    Mean    Std. Dev. 
Logit-transformed proportion of expenditure on public services                             -1.264    2.462 
to total village expenditure in 2002 (raw figures in parentheses)                              (.358)    (.263) 
Village cadres are appointed by direct election and                                                   .884    .321 
villagers can nominate candidates directly        
Village cadres are appointed by upper administration                                                .072    .259 
Number of villagers meetings held in 2002                                                              3.124     1.444 
Villages provide collectively managed irrigation service                                          .272    .446 
using village-owned facilities (dummy)       
Villages provide mechanized cultivating service                                                      .200    .401 
Size of village budget in 2002 (yuan)                                                                  170.334    527.507 
 
Variables used in Table 5 (Number of observations: 433 villages) 
    Variable                                                                                                                    Mean    Std. Dev.  
Village cadre's judgment on the changes in the educational expenditure                     1.610     .654 
on the village's primary education after the tax-for-fee reform             
Increase rate of in-budget revenue of county government                                             .328     .762 
Increase rate of intergovernmental fiscal transfer from                                                1.950     1.997  
the upper-level governments between 1998-2001 
urban-bias in educational expenditure between 1998-2001                                            .970     .377  
Progress of retrenchment of the county government                                                      .427     .495     
Per capita GDP at the county level 2001 (1000 yuan)                                                  5.802     4.408  
Square of county's per capita GDP                                                                              53.042     89.780   
Dummy for nationally designated poor county                                                               .242     .429     
Dummy for villages located in the autonomous regions                                                 .044     .205  
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Notes 
 
*1 Paper presented at the Beijing Forum 2006 "The Harmony of Civilizations and Prosperity 
for All", co-hosted by Peking University and Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, 
and the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies, October 27-29, 2006, at the Great 
People's Hall and Peking University.  
2 The survey was conducted in collaboration with several foreign researchers including the 
author. The 2002 CASS CHIP survey was funded mainly by the Ford Foundation and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and partly funded by the Grant in 
Aid for Scientific Research of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and 
Hitotsubashi University. The author is grateful for their generous support. 
3 See Sato, Li, and Yue (2006) and Sato, Li, and Yue (forthcoming) for detailed introduction 
of the taxation reform. 
4 The per capita size of village expenditure in pre-reform villages is larger than post-reform 
villages. This is because the tax-for-fee reforms were more likely to be launched where the 
need for reform was higher, that is, where the level of the tax burden was heavier, but where 
the amount of public service provision was small compared with the level of the tax burden. 
See Sato, Li and Yue (2006) and Sato, Li, and Yue (forthcoming) for detailed discussion. 
5 Logit-transformed variable r is defined as ln (r/(1 – r). 
6 See Appendix B for the descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation. 
7 Note that all the county fiscal statistics used here are deflated to 1998 prices using the rural 
consumer price index at the province level. 